Commit Graph

334 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
chrg6
a789bd8fb0 Put a held present out under a lock of its own that submitting threads only try, so that it goes out once, whole and before the next present.
With the replay on the submitting thread, a present that waits for event-ordered work (vk_backend.c PH) goes out after
the submission that replays the last of that work, at the next present, or after PH_MAX submissions. The game submits
from several threads while one of them presents, so that submission may be another thread's. PH had no lock: two
submitting threads could both pass ph_flush's check of PH.on and put one frame out twice; a thread reading PH's fields
while the presenting thread armed the next frame could put out a job mixed from two frames; and a held frame put out on
a submitting thread could reach the present thread after the presenting thread's next frame, a picture back in time.

runtime/vk_present_held.h now holds PH's job, its arming, putting out and counts behind PH.lock. Submitting threads
only try the lock (ph_flush_try) and go on when another thread holds it: that thread is putting a present out or arming
one, and the next submission, the next present or PH_MAX checks again, the bound there was before. The presenting
thread takes it for every synchronous present while held presents are on (ph_flush_next, ph_present), so the
synchronous present_image calls run one at a time and in the game's order. That is the one new wait, and only the
presenting thread makes it: only while another thread puts a held present out, for at most that present_image. It is
counted (lock_waits, lock_wait_ns, lock_wait_max) and timed as PERF_DRAIN. No path holds the lock across held_resume,
which is a replay. Neither 0.10.0 fresh log has a held present at all ("went out" and "presents that waited" lines),
so the wait is not expected in normal play. present_held = 0 turns held presents off, and with them every use of the
lock.

Not reproduced before the change. Checks that passed: the new tests/present_held_check (one presenting and three
submitting threads over 200,000 frames: every frame out once, in order and never two at once; the unlocked 0.10.1
shape through the same harness gave about 205,000 presents for 200,000 frames, 6,000 to 8,000 out of order or twice and
8,000 to 12,000 at the same time; step-by-step cases; a submitting thread gives up on a held lock at once and the
presenting thread's wait is counted), pass_cc_check on every runtime file, no new -Wall -Wextra warnings in
vk_backend.c.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-13 20:13:02 -05:00
chrg6
4506988335 Make upscaler_idle_check fail where a place that lets something go frees it at once.
The review of 2b9b3061 found that the check missed the dangerous regression. It only checked that each place that lets
something go calls vk_upscaler_let_go, so with destroy_size put back in vk_dlaa.c free_size, or hl_destroy in
hudless_from's size change, it still passed, while either frees images or a DLSS feature a frame still in flight uses.

The check now also fails when:
- a function that lets go of what the GPU may still use (vk_dlaa.c free_size, free_snap, stale_sizes, release_kept,
  retire_idle, evaluate and the retire_size, retire_feat, retire_snap, retire_hl and retire_pb helpers; vk_ffx.cpp
  context_for, trim, retire_up, vk_ffx_trim_idle and vk_ffx_release_idle; vk_ffx4.cpp context_for, vk_ffx4_trim,
  retire_up and vk_ffx4_release_idle) calls a destroy that frees at once (destroy_size, destroy_snap, hl_destroy,
  pb_destroy, feat_release, N.release, vkDestroyImageView, vmaDestroyImage; A.destroy in the FSR files);
- hudless_from, pb_images or snap_for call one of those before their first image2d call (after it, only their half-made
  new images are destroyed);
- upd_take_all, which releases a whole list whatever its gates, is called outside teardown (vk_dlaa_release,
  vk_ffx_release, vk_ffx4_release) and a full list's fallback (dead_put, the FSR files' retire_up), or there before
  vk_upscaler_settle's wait for the device.
docs/building.md "Checks" says so.

Each of 19 mutations of scratch copies fails the check (destroy_size in free_size and retire_idle, hl_destroy in
hudless_from, pb_destroy in pb_images, destroy_snap in free_snap and snap_for, feat_release in release_kept, N.release in
stale_sizes, vmaDestroyImage in retire_size, upd_take_all in retire_hl, A.destroy in FSR 3.1's retire_up and in either
file's trim and release_idle, dead_put and FSR 4's retire_up without the settle, FSR 3.1 and FSR 4 without the retry);
the unchanged
sources pass, and stability-pass's sources fail with 46 problems. tools/check_content.py --staged passes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-13 20:13:02 -05:00
chrg6
61f08a177d Try an FSR 3.1 context creation once more after the GPU is past the contexts let go of, instead of failing the run.
The review of 09027478 found that FSR 3.1 lost its fallback for a refused creation. Up to 0.10.1, vk_ffx.cpp
context_for waited for the device and destroyed the other render size's or the least recently used context before
create_counted, so their video memory was free for the new one. Since 09027478 they only go into g_dead, and the drain
in vk_upscaler_let_go destroys those whose last upscale the GPU is past. When it is still behind and the library
refuses the new context for want of memory, context_for returned nullptr, vk_ffx_upscale 0, and evaluate's dl_fail
turned DLAA off for the run. DLSS (evaluate) and FSR 4 (context_for) already wait for the GPU to pass what they let go
of and try again.

context_for now does the same when the creation is refused and FSR 3.1's or FSR 4's list of contexts let go of is not
empty: vk_upscaler_gpu_wait (a timeline wait for those submissions, not the device's idle; the device with
upscaler_idle_wait = 1), vk_ffx_dead_take, and a second create_counted when something was destroyed. A line says the
refusal, the wait and the outcome. upscaler_idle_check now also fails when vk_dlaa.c evaluate or vk_ffx.cpp or
vk_ffx4.cpp context_for has no vk_upscaler_gpu_wait (a scratch copy without the retry fails it), and docs/building.md
says so.

Not reproduced before the change (found by review). Checks that passed: vk_ffx.cpp compiles with -Wall -Wextra and no
warning, upscaler_idle_check, tools/check_content.py --staged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-13 20:13:02 -05:00
chrg6
ed87d30628 Check from the sources that no upscaler waits for the device where it lets something go.
tests/upscaler_idle_check.py reads vk_dlaa.c, vk_ffx.cpp and vk_ffx4.cpp with their comments and strings blanked and
fails when vkDeviceWaitIdle is called outside vk_upscaler_device_idle and the --probe-ffx-cache path, when
vk_upscaler_device_idle is called outside vk_upscaler_settle and vk_upscaler_gpu_wait, or when one of the ten places
that let something go does not call vk_upscaler_let_go, through which NX2NAVI_UPSCALER_IDLE_WAIT=1 brings the old wait
back. It also checks that switch's sections[] entry and nx2navi.ini.example line (cfg_rows_check has its known[] name
and metas[] row), that perf.c names every PERF_M_* kind (a kind without a name prints a null string on a slow frame's
line), and that pb_images notes PB.used after the last call that clears PB.

On this branch it passes. On the base of this branch's work (stability-pass, 1f547853) it reports the twelve waits of
C-6 and Cv-1, each with its function, and on the first commit of this branch, where the waits went through
vk_upscaler_device_idle, the same twelve places. docs/building.md "Checks" describes it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-13 20:13:01 -05:00
chrg6
86e6d62d35 Add a list of what an upscaler lets go of, released once the GPU is past it, and its unit check.
runtime/vk_up_defer.h holds, per owner, a DLSS feature, an FSR context or an image frame generation can still read,
each with the timeline value of the last submission that named it and an optional present count. upd_take releases,
in the order they were put, the entries whose value the GPU has reached and whose present count has passed; nothing
in it waits or locks, so the owner checks at its own calls on the thread that makes its other upscaler calls. It is
the piece the next commits use to take the upscalers' device-idle waits off the replaying thread: those waits stall
the present's flip, the completion thread and upload submits with the queue lock held, at every pause-screen size,
reload, window size or mode change. Nothing uses it yet.

tests/up_defer_check.py builds tests/up_defer_check.c with the header as C and as C++ (vk_ffx.cpp and vk_ffx4.cpp
include it) with -Wall -Wextra -Werror and checks both gates, the order, a full list, a null handle and a release that
puts. It passed, and failed with each of three faults put into a copy of the header.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-13 20:13:01 -05:00
chrg6
a8d18ef474 Ask an armed region's page state under the freeze lock when a fault finds its range gone, so that a late write is not taken for a frozen page's and a read is not passed on past an arm.
The review found two windows in memory.c lazy_fault, where a fault holding frz_lock and lz_lock finds its address
neither armed nor in flight. It returned 0 there, and access_fault then asked for the page's state without a lock.
A write whose range a flight gave back while the write waited for frz_lock went on to thaw_fault, whose thaw released
every armed range of the 2 MiB region (lazy_drop_region_locked), each fetched under the lock. And after a release
that sets no hold (mem_lazy_skip's give-back of another buffer's range), the completion thread could arm the page
again between that 0 and access_fault's query, so a read saw an inaccessible page and went to the crash handler; that
one predates the ranges in flight.

Now a fault that finds a flight there waits for it as before. Otherwise it releases lz_lock, asks for the page's state
while it still holds frz_lock, under which no arm runs, and runs the access again when the page allows it: a read on
a readable page, a write on a read-write one. A write to a frozen page still goes on to thaw_fault, and an address
that is not ours to the crash handler.

The new late_write scenario of tests/lazy_fetch_check.py has a thread write a range whose release starts and ends
while the write waits for frz_lock: the write runs again and the region's other range stays armed. With the old
return of 0 it fails, the other range released. The read's window has no check: the arm would have to land between
two instructions. Not reproduced in the game before the change; lazy_fetch_check passed in all its scenarios.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-13 20:12:50 -05:00
chrg6
da60e0d327 Make wb_lazy_unlocked = 0 bring back 0.10.1's locking in evictions and releases as well, which the review found it did not.
With the setting at 0, frz_lock was held across every fault's and release's fetch again and mem_thaw released under the
lock, but two parts of the new code stayed. vk_memory.c mirror_evict and hot_check still fetched their victims'
armed ranges before taking pool_lock again, and a release still put up to 16 copies in one submission. Those are the
parts that run only with a device and have no check without one, so a device loss caused by them was the one case the
switch could not take back. Now vk_memory.c reads the setting too (evict_unlocked, once on the replay thread, where
both run): at 0 neither drops pool_lock, and the release under it fetches everything, victim by victim, as before. And
memory.c lazy_take_batch_locked takes one segment at a time at 0, so each is fetched on its own.

What stays at 0 is the table of ranges in flight: a touch of a range being fetched waits for that fetch and runs
again (a write no longer goes on to thaw_fault and releases its region), the hold is set as the range goes out, and
mem_lazy_touches counts the range. memory.c "Ranges in flight", nx2navi.ini.example and docs/building.md say so.

tests/lazy_fetch_check.py gains locked_release, the release scenario at 0: three fetches of one copy each, where the
batched release makes two of up to two copies. It fails with the cap taken out. The eviction's side has a compile
check only. Not reproduced before the change; lazy_fetch_check passed in all its scenarios.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-13 20:12:50 -05:00
chrg6
0eee849948 Check that a thaw fetches the armed ranges of its regions without the freeze lock, which the review found untested.
memory.c mem_thaw calls lazy_release_regions before it takes frz_lock, so the copy a file read's thaw needs (the
buffer's armed ranges with stale bytes) no longer holds up the other threads' faults, freezes, thaws and arms. All 20
scenarios of tests/lazy_fetch_check.py passed with that call taken out: the thaw scenario reaches the same end state
through thaw_begin_locked's lazy_drop_region_locked under the lock. The new thaw_unlocked scenario has a thread thaw a
page of a range armed with stale bytes while the fetch takes 300 ms, and freezes another region meanwhile: the freeze
returns at once, and took 300 ms with the call taken out. locked_thaw runs it with NX2NAVI_WB_LAZY_UNLOCKED=0, where
the freeze waits for the fetch as in 0.10.1.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-13 20:12:50 -05:00
chrg6
92121a11e8 Check that an arm keeps its region marked while a range in flight there ends, which the review found untested.
memory.c mem_lazy_arm marks the region it protects in lz_arm_r, so that lazy_flags_locked keeps lzr set when a
release's flight in the same region ends during the arm's clean test. Without that mark the flight's end cleared lzr,
lazy_fault let a read of the arming range go, and access_fault passed it to the crash handler. All 20 scenarios of
tests/lazy_fetch_check.py passed with the mark taken out. The new arm_flight scenario has a release fetch one range for
100 ms, an arm of another range of the region wait 400 ms in its clean test, and a read of that range fault after the
flight ended: it passes, and exits with an access violation when lazy_flags_locked ignores lz_arm_r.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-13 20:12:50 -05:00
chrg6
2e077edc9d Fetch the lazy write-back's ranges without the freeze lock, so a touch of GPU-written memory holds up only the threads that touch that range, with wb_lazy_unlocked = 0 to go back.
A CPU touch of an armed range ran its fetch (vk_memory.c lazy_fetch: a GPU copy after everything handed over, and a wait of up to 10 s) inside the fault handler under frz_lock. Every other fault, thaw, freeze and arm waited for the whole copy meanwhile: the replay's copies of guest memory (mem_copy_readable, vk_memory.c mirror_capture) and its freeze pass, the completion thread's arms, file reads and pool finalizes. A write that lost the race to the fetch went to thaw_fault after it and released every other armed range of its 2 MiB region, a second fetch. mirror_evict and hot_check fetched their victims' ranges under the exclusive pool_lock, which the completion thread's arms and every pool lookup wait for. This is AUDIT F-4-05 (C-12); the design's probe of the unchanged code had an unrelated mem_copy_readable, arm and freeze each wait 299 ms behind a 300 ms fetch, and the losing write 378.8 ms with two fetches.

A range now leaves the armed list into a table of ranges in flight (memory.c "Ranges in flight", lz_fly) in the same lz_lock hold, and stays there, its pages inaccessible, until its bytes are down and its pages read-write again (lazy_fly_run), without frz_lock. A fault on a range in flight waits for that entry alone on lz_lock's condition and runs the access again, the losing write included; a thaw, a mapping change, a release of its buffer, an arm, a freeze and mem_lazy_touches see it. Every store to lzr is made under lz_lock from the list, the entries and the region an arm is protecting (lz_arm_r, which replaces the previous commit's restore). An entry starts under frz_lock and lz_lock and ends under lz_lock alone, so a holder of frz_lock may wait for one: its fetch takes only the queue lock, which no frz_lock taker holds. mem_thaw releases what is armed in its regions before it takes frz_lock (lazy_release_regions), so file reads and pool finalizes fetch without it; a mapping change's thaw still fetches under it, as its page calls follow. The holds a fault sets (lz_hot, lz_hots) are now set as the range goes into flight, so an arm meanwhile finds them. The fetch takes several copies in one submission and one wait (MemLazyCopy), and the back end has four slots of command pool, command buffer and fence, so fetches of different ranges run at once; a release takes up to 16 armed ranges out together.

mirror_evict and hot_check now fetch what only their victims' mirrors hold before taking pool_lock exclusively, and then, under the lock, release only what was armed since (usually nothing) before the mirror leaves the list and the device address table names the imported buffer again. The design moved the release after the lock instead, which would have had the table change before the fetch: a shader of a submission still running reads through the table as it changes, and the fetch waits for every submission handed over. A victim that vk_pool_fini took off the list meanwhile is left to it; hot_check copies its log line's fields under the lock, as its records may be freed once the lock drops.

The new setting wb_lazy_unlocked (NX2NAVI_WB_LAZY_UNLOCKED, default 1, restart) set to 0 keeps frz_lock from the take-out to the end of each flight and leaves mem_thaw's releases to the thaw, as in 0.10.1; the table, the slots and the eviction order stay. The "mem: lazy write-back" line counts segments fetched; a second line gives the touches that waited for a range in flight, the longest such wait and the most ranges in flight at once; "mem: sizes" counts fetches that found every slot busy. The frz_lock and lz_lock comments say what holds what now (B-12). mem_lazy_touches has callers outside memory.c (camera_speed.c, nvn_api_cmd.c ctl_fingerprint), which now skip a range in flight instead of faulting on it and waiting.

Not reproduced in the game before the change. tests\lazy_fetch_check.py now runs 20 scenarios as their own processes: arm races, no stall of freezes, copies, arms, thaws and releases of other ranges during a fetch, joins with frz_lock held elsewhere, a losing write that keeps the region's other range armed, two fetches at once, a thaw, a mapping change and a release meeting a range in flight, an arm refused over one, the foreign give-back, the chunk mode, the old wait with wb_lazy_unlocked = 0 (joins and losing writes as well), the report lines, 80 touching threads past the 64 entries, and a freeze refused; all pass, in six runs. Taking the join before frz_lock out fails the join scenario. cfg_rows_check reports 0 problems; every runtime file compiles, and memory.c and vk_memory.c add no -Wall -Wextra warning; the test matrix passes 75 of 77, installer_test and worktree_test failing for the environment as before. vk_memory.c's slots and the eviction's order have no check without a device.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-13 20:12:50 -05:00
chrg6
f586c291fa Give the longest lazy fetch and the longest wait of a fault for the freeze lock on the "mem: lazy write-back" line.
A fetch of lazily written pages runs inside the fault handler under frz_lock (memory.c lazy_gone_locked and lazy_piece_fetch_locked call vk_memory.c lazy_fetch, a GPU copy after everything handed over and a wait for it), so every other fault, thaw, freeze and arm waits for the whole copy. The line gave only the fetches' sum: the 0.10.0 session's 848 fetches took 415.8 ms in all, and how long one took, or how long another thread waited behind it, was not known. Both fetch sites now keep the longest fetch, and lazy_fault keeps the longest time a fault waited to take frz_lock; the report line prints them as "the longest X ms, faults waited up to Y ms for the freeze lock" and starts both over. No tool parses the line.

tests\lazy_fetch_check.py's new report scenario fetches for 30 and 120 ms and has a third fault wait 60 ms for frz_lock: the line reads 120.29 ms and 60.03 ms, and the next one 0.00 for both. arm_race, arm_race_slow, wb_lazy_check and heap_lazy_copy_check passed; memory.c compiles without a warning under -Wall -Wextra.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-13 20:12:50 -05:00
chrg6
ef0673fba0 Mark a region for the lazy write-back before its pages become inaccessible, so that a read during an arm is not passed to the crash handler.
mem_lazy_arm made a range's pages inaccessible (lazy_protect_locked: the protect, then the back end's clean test) and set the region's lzr mark only after the segment was in the list. lazy_fault returns 0 at once for an unmarked region, without taking frz_lock, so a CPU read in that window found the page inaccessible in access_fault and went to the crash handler as an access violation. A write survived only because thaw_fault waits for frz_lock. Arms come from the completion thread (vk_memory.c vk_gpu_written_back) when a submission's fence completes, which is when the game's own fence wait returns and it reads the results; the window lasts as long as the protect and the clean test, which can take tens of milliseconds while the driver pins memory.

The mark is now set before the protect, after the cheap refusals, and put back when the protect or the clean test refuses the arm. A fault from the protect on finds the mark, waits for frz_lock and then finds the segment, or the pages given back. Every store to lzr is made under frz_lock, which the arm holds, so putting it back is exact.

Not reproduced in the game before the change. The new tests\lazy_fetch_check.py reproduces it with the real Windows fault handler: a thread reads a page while it is armed and given back 20,000 times (arm_race: an access violation in 5 of 6 runs before the change), and once with a clean test of 100 ms (arm_race_slow: an access violation in every run). Both pass in every run since. wb_lazy_check, heap_lazy_copy_check, freeze_hold_check and mem_growth_check passed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-13 20:12:50 -05:00
chrg6
5ee960f811 Add NX2NAVI_GEN_SEED, a test switch that starts the page write generations at a given value, so a play-test can cross 2^32 in seconds instead of 15 to 66 hours.
Whether the 64-bit generations hold past 2^32 in the game, with every texture check, mirror sync and shadow copy of a
real scene, could not be seen in play: reaching 2^32 takes 15 to 66 hours. gen_wrap_check shows it for the generation
code alone. NX2NAVI_GEN_SEED=<n> (nx2navi.ini gen_seed, diagnostics, default 0) makes the run's first generation
n + 1: with 4294966000 a run passes 2^32 within its first seconds, and with 1099511627000 the low 32 bits pass
through 0 again.

The first gen_next, before anything is stamped, reads the value (gen_seed). It is parsed with strtoull, decimal or
0x hexadecimal: strtoul stops at 2^32 - 1 where unsigned long is 32 bits, as on Windows, and would turn a seed past
32 bits into 4294967295 without a word. It is capped at 2^62, far from the 64-bit end, and only ever raises the
counter, since a lower value would leave stamps newer than it that read as written at every check. A value that is
no number, or negative, is logged and ignored; a seed in use is logged as "mem: page generations start at <n>
(NX2NAVI_GEN_SEED, a test switch)". Without the switch the only cost is one compare a generation that is true once.

cfg.c gets its metas row (0, 0..4611686018427387904, read at start), its known[] name and its sections[] entry, each
on a line of its own next to the other memory test switches (STAGING_FAIL_AT, VRAM_BALLAST_MB); nx2navi.ini.example
gets a commented gen_seed entry under [diagnostics]. The settings menu does not show it.

tests/gen_wrap_check runs the generation code a second way: the counter left at 0 and the seed taken from
NX2NAVI_GEN_SEED, for 4294967288, 0xfffffffff8, 0x7ffffffffffffff8 (capped), 12abc, -8, 0 and unset, each with the
start and the log line expected of it, then the same compares across the boundary. With strtoul in place of strtoull
two of those runs fail. Checks that passed: gen_wrap_check, gen_width_check, cfg_rows_check (0 problems),
pass_cc_check on vk_memory.c and cfg.c, no new -Wall -Wextra warnings.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-13 20:12:50 -05:00
chrg6
6b95c867c8 Make the page write generations 64-bit, so a long session no longer wraps them and every texture, mirror and shadow check after the wrap answers wrong.
vk_memory.c handed out page write generations from a 32-bit counter (gen_now) and every consumer compared them as
32-bit values, with 0 meaning "never stamped". At 124 to 336 generations a frame (a 0.10.0 log with trace = perf) the
counter wrapped after about 66 h of play at 60 fps, 27.6 h at 144 and 15 to 17 h at 240. Past the wrap a stamp made
before it compared newer than every later check and one made after it older: textures and VRAM mirrors missed the
CPU's writes (stale textures, and the lazy fetch copying older mirror bytes over a CPU write), pages nothing wrote read
as written at every check (a hash or upload every time, and every such page of a mirrored pool copied up at each
sync), and the generation handed out at the wrap was 0. At 64 bits nothing wraps: 2^64 lasts millions of years at
336 a frame and 240 fps. Below 2^32 every value and every compare is the same as before.

What changed: gen_now, both tables (gen_chunk, cgen_chunk), reg_max and creg_max, PoolRec's synced_gen, mgen and sgen,
dirty_gen and DIRTY_UNSYNCED, VSample.mgen, every local and parameter that holds a generation in vk_memory.c,
vk_texture.c (Tex.wgen and gpu_gen, PEnt.since, storage_rewritten and its callers, sweep_hard's write-back check
included) and tex_probe.c, and vk.h's vk_mem_changed, vk_mem_changed_snap and vk_mem_unchanged(_why)_locked. The verify
mode's mismatch line prints the generations with %llu. The readers that take no gen_lock (lazy_clean, cpu_wrote_since,
verify_cb, vk_mem_sizes) stay lock-free at 64 bits: the slots, mgen, gen_now and a new chunk pointer are now stored
atomically (relaxed, or release where a reader acquires), the same instructions on x86-64, and a static assertion
holds that 64-bit atomics are lock-free. No lock, wait or thread changes.

gen_next, which hands out every generation, no longer warns at 0xC0000000 and up or at the wrap, which cannot come;
it logs one line when the count reaches 2^32, where earlier versions ran out, with the frame, the hours and the rate.

Cost: the tables take 8 bytes a page instead of 4 (512 KiB more per 256 MiB of guest address space stamped, both
tables together, allocated as before when a chunk is first stamped), reg_max and creg_max 2 MiB each instead of 1,
Tex and PoolRec 8 bytes more, PEnt 8 more. The page walks read 8 bytes a slot; a micro-benchmark of the walk measured no
difference.

Not reproduced in the game before the change: the wrong answers were reproduced by compiling vk_memory.c's generation
code with the counter seeded below 2^32. tests/gen_wrap_check now runs that code, with the readers outside its
section, across 2^32, 2^40 and 2^63 and checks that the compares answer as below the boundary; on the code before the
change 19 of its checks fail at 2^32 and the other two seeds do not fit the counter. The new tests/gen_width_check
compiles vk_memory.c, vk_texture.c and tex_probe.c with -Wshorten-64-to-32, -Wformat and -Wincompatible-pointer-types
as errors, so a 32-bit local left behind is found (shown by reverting single locals, fields and formats). Checks that
passed: gen_wrap_check, gen_width_check, pass_cc_check of every runtime file, no new -Wall -Wextra warnings in the
three files, tex_release_check, tex_compact_check, wb_lazy_check, gpa_check, mem_growth_check, mem_budget_check.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-13 20:12:50 -05:00
chrg6
358713fbf2 Trap unsigned wrap-around in tests/dlssg_pace_check.py, as its comment on overflows promised.
The review found that the comment said an overflow in the period arithmetic fails the check, but -fsanitize=undefined
does not trap unsigned wrap-around, and every period and time in runtime/dlssg_pace.h is a uint64_t. The check now
builds with -fsanitize=undefined,unsigned-integer-overflow and the same -fsanitize-trap list, and the comment says
why. It passes; a uint64_t subtraction that wraps traps under these flags and runs on under the old ones.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-13 20:12:50 -05:00
chrg6
0131b1b263 Stop a launcher release and a build kit on an nx2navi_dlssg.dll that lacks an export runtime/dlssg/nx2_sl.h declares, before they download anything.
The review found that nothing on the release path ran the new export check: tools/make_launcher.py build_app and
tools/make_kit.py copied whatever --dlssg DLL they were given, and the release script still named the DLL of 0.8.0,
which lacks nx2sl_reflex2. Shipped that way, Reflex would never hold the frame limit while players still got this
branch's other changes. make_launcher.py check_dlssg and make_kit.py main now run build_dlssg.check on the --dlssg DLL
beside the translator's check, before anything is resolved, downloaded or deleted; build_dlssg.check also stops on a
missing file and on a file that is no DLL, with a message instead of a traceback. tests/dlssg_exports_check.py adds a
DLL with every declared export (it passes), the two-export DLL, a missing file and two files that are no DLL (they
stop, naming why), make_launcher.check_dlssg on both DLLs, and that both scripts' main makes the check before
streamline_pin.resolve and shutil.rmtree; it fails when the call is taken out of make_launcher.py main. The DLL built
from this branch passes make_launcher.check_dlssg; the DLL of 0.8.0 is refused, naming nx2sl_reflex2.
docs/launcher.md and docs/building.md "Checks" say so.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-13 20:12:49 -05:00
chrg6
9f4f51f010 Fail tools/build_dlssg.py when nx2navi_dlssg.dll lacks an export nx2_sl.h declares, and let it check a DLL built earlier.
The runtime takes a missing optional export (nx2sl_reflex2, nx2sl_frames_max) for an older DLL and leaves the
feature out with one log line, so a release that ships a DLL built from older sources than its runtime loses Reflex's
frame limit without an error; the release script took the DLL of 0.8.0 from a fixed path. After the build,
build_dlssg.py now reads every PFN_nx2sl_<name> in runtime/dlssg/nx2_sl.h and the DLL's export directory (a small
PE reader of its own, PE32 and PE32+) and exits naming each export that is missing; --check <dll> makes the same
check without building. tests/dlssg_exports_check.py builds a DLL with two of three declared exports with MSYS2's
clang and checks that the third is named, and that nx2_sl.h's own declarations are read in full; docs/building.md
"Checks" and docs/launcher.md name both. The DLL built from this branch with the pinned Streamline 2.14.16 SDK passes
(15 exports); the one built before nx2sl_reflex2 fails, naming it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-13 20:12:49 -05:00
chrg6
2bf32649af Name the game's frame-rate ceiling as a period of its own, frame_step_ceiling_ns, for a pacer that hands the limit over.
When Reflex holds the frame limit with DLSS Frame Generation, the game's pacer is to keep only the rate the game's
code survives (240 a second; the quick menu read address 0 at 640 to 700), so that a limiter that lets go, or one
that counts other frames than the game's, cannot run the game past it. frame_step_ceiling_ns gives that period
from LIMIT_FREE_MAX_HZ, or LIMIT_MAX_HZ for a build with the fps60 or realtime patch set; frame_step_cap_ns is left
as it is. tests/frame_step_check.c checks 4166666 ns for a game stepping by the clock; frame_step_check passes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-13 20:12:26 -05:00
chrg6
2d6f9f07b2 Decide who holds the frame limit with DLSS Frame Generation in a header of its own, runtime/dlssg_pace.h, with a check.
Reflex can hold the frame limit where each frame starts (nx2sl_reflex2), but the driver only takes a limit through
Streamline, the SDK does not say whether its minimum interval counts the frames the game draws or every frame on
screen, and nothing tells the game that the limit holds. dlssg_pace_step decides from what the presenting guest
thread sees alone: the limit Reflex should be given (the drawn period, 0 during a movie, before the first host
present, after 200 ms without one, or when not allowed), and whether Reflex holds this frame's limit, which it does
only once Streamline took exactly that limit. Over windows of 60 presents Reflex held to one period and multiplier,
over half sooner than three quarters of the period means nothing holds the game and the pacer takes the limit for
the run; over half the multiplier periods apart means the driver counted the frames on screen, and Reflex is given
the period over the multiplier from then on, or the pacer the limit if it happens again. Being pure, the decision is
checked without a GPU: tests/dlssg_pace_check.py builds it with undefined-behaviour traps and drives it through
each case; four mutations of the header (the window's majority, the idle bound, a host present stamped after the
clock read, the applied-limit test) each fail it. docs/building.md "Checks" names it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-13 20:12:26 -05:00
chrg6
c19f75e505 Check that a crash on RivaTuner Statistics Server's own thread, with no line in the state file, returns at once.
The review found that no test ran rtss_limit_crash's thread gate: where the state file holds no line of the run,
rtss_limit_crash puts the profile back through rtss_limit_restore, except on the worker's own thread, which may hold
the lock that restore tries for a second; only the static check in tests/rtss_limit_check.py looked at it.
tests/rtss_worker_check.c crash_worker_thread now makes the state file unwritable and calls rtss_limit_crash from inside
SaveProfile on the worker thread, with the lock held: it must return within 200 ms with no call into the fake hooks
library (a new count of every call), close the run, and let no later want reach the profile. With the gate removed
from a copy of rtss_limit.c, the scenario fails.

Checks that passed: tests/rtss_limit_check.py, tools/check_content.py --staged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-13 20:12:26 -05:00
chrg6
9f45d7448f Leave rtss-profile.txt alone when it is there but does not read, so the lines of other executables in the folder stay.
The review found that rtss_limit.c state_put took a state file plat_file_read could not read for a missing one: a file
another program held open (a scan) was rewritten with this profile's line alone, or deleted when the run removed its
line, and the lines of other executables that share the folder (dev or probe builds) were lost. state_put now returns
0 when the read gave nothing but plat_file_size finds the file with bytes in it; the run then goes on as with a file
that cannot be written (one log line, and a crash puts the profile back as an orderly exit does). An empty file is
still rewritten. tests/rtss_worker_check.c state_locked checks a file holding another executable's line that does not
read: the run limits as before, logs it, and the file stays as it was through the exit.

Not reproduced before the change. Checks that passed: tests/rtss_limit_check.py, pass_cc_check.py --wall on
rtss_limit.c, tools/check_content.py --staged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-13 20:12:26 -05:00
chrg6
da822abec3 Keep the state file's line ahead of RivaTuner Statistics Server's profile, and keep what a run owes the profile after a put back that did not land.
The review found three ways rtss-profile.txt could fall behind the profile. Every write after a run's first one saved
the profile before the line, so a kill between the two left a line whose value the profile no longer held, and the
next start took the game's limit for the player's (rtss_restore_plan LEAVE). A put back whose write did not land kept
the line, but rtss_put_back_done cleared S.changed, so a later limit took the run's first-write path again and read the
game's own limit from the profile as the value to put back, overwriting the true one in the line. And put_back removed
the line after DeleteProfile without checking that the profile went away.

The line now carries the value the run wrote before the newest one (rtss_decide.h RtssSaved prev_limit and prev_den,
rtss1 with two more fields; the file came with this branch and was never released). rtss_limit.c apply writes the new
value into the line before the profile (record_before) and drops the previous one once the profile holds the new one,
or returns to it when RTSS refused it (record_after), and rtss_restore_plan takes a profile holding either value for
the game's. A new owed flag keeps had_profile, old_limit and old_denominator from the run's first write until a put
back lands: a later first write keeps them and the line's values, a failed first write leaves the line alone, and
rtss_limit_restore tries the put back again at the exit. put_back and restore_left check that a deleted profile is
gone before they remove the line, and restore_left's lines name the value the profile held. tests/rtss_limit_check.c
covers the new fields and the plan for either value; tests/rtss_worker_check.c checks the line before and after a
write (state_record), a run killed inside the save of its second limit and the next start removing the profile
(kill_restart_mid_write), a put back that did not land followed by a limit and the exit (put_back_owed), and a removal
that did not land (put_back_undeleted). Lines over 120 columns from the earlier fixes are wrapped.

Not reproduced before the change. Checks that passed: tests/rtss_limit_check.py (44 of 44), tests/exit_order_check.py,
tests/fatal_exit_check.py, pass_cc_check.py --wall on rtss_limit.c, tools/check_content.py --staged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-13 20:12:26 -05:00
chrg6
1744681f1a Give up on RivaTuner Statistics Server for the run when it hooks the game with the limit for 30 s and never shows it holds it.
The review found that nothing ended an RTSS hold that was never proven: when RTSS listed the game with the limit in
its profile but one sign never came (presents of another API value than Vulkan's, the update flag never cleared, a
period that never moved), the profile kept the limit and the game's pacer held the frames too for the whole run, two
limiters where the pacing rules allow one, with only a reason line in the log and nothing in the menu. Before the
hold had to be proven, RTSS alone held the game once it listed it. rtss_decide.h rtss_decide now counts the polls in a
row where RTSS lists the game, the profile holds a limit of this run (not "none"), a picture went out within 200 ms
and the hold is not shown; at RTSS_UNPROVEN_POLLS (60, 30 s) it puts the profile back and RTSS is out for the run
(RTSS_FAIL_UNPROVEN, "RivaTuner Statistics Server never showed it holds the game"). A minimised window, RTSS not
hooked, a want of no limit, a kept-out want or a poll that shows the hold start the count again. rtss_limit.c logs the
give-up, rtss_limit_state returns 3 for it, so the menu says RivaTuner does not limit the game and the game does, and
rtss_out_of_limit counts it, so a limit set in RTSS itself is reported as a second limiter. The comment above
rtss_decide, rewritten for the rule, is wrapped at 120 columns and no longer cites rtss_fresh, which does not exist.
tests/rtss_limit_check.c checks each sign that never comes (given up at the 60th poll, once, for the run), the polls
that do not count and a shown hold restarting the count; tests/rtss_worker_check.c unproven_run checks it against the
real worker. docs/architecture.md, docs/building.md and nx2navi.ini.example describe the rule and the remaining window
of two limiters before it.

This changes when the game takes the limit back from RTSS, beyond the approved rules: an RTSS whose hold never shows
in its shared memory (a version or setting that differs) is now left out after 30 s and the game's limiter holds
alone, as with rtss = 0, where it held the frames beside the game's limiter before. Not reproduced before the change.
Checks that passed: tests/rtss_limit_check.py (41 of 41), pass_cc_check.py --wall on rtss_limit.c,
tools/check_content.py --staged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-13 20:12:26 -05:00
chrg6
a7b4f0c7cb Put back a profile a run that did not close left in RivaTuner Statistics Server, also at a start that keeps RTSS out.
The review found that the worker read rtss-profile.txt only on its first poll with the hooks library, which it loads
only for a limit, so a start with frame generation on, with the driver's low latency on from the first present, or
with NX2NAVI_RTSS=0 never put back a killed run's limit: RTSS then went on limiting the game at that value (counting
the generated frames too under frame generation), and the log and the menu reported it as the player's own limit
beside the game's limiter. rtss_limit.c worker now looks at the state file on its first poll that finds RTSS running
(left_start): a limit puts the profile back with the library it loads anyway, as before; frame generation and low
latency load the library for that one restore (restore_left, which now takes the line found); NX2NAVI_RTSS=0 keeps the
thread read-only and logs that the file holds the game's limit from a run that did not close and that a start with
RTSS let in puts it back. A restore the library could not be loaded for waits for the first poll with the library.
tests/rtss_worker_check.c adds kill_restart_framegen (the next start asks frame generation first: the profile is
removed, no limit written, the line gone) and kill_restart_setting (NX2NAVI_RTSS=0: no library loaded, the profile and
the line stay, the log says so). The rtss_limit.c header, docs/architecture.md, docs/building.md and
nx2navi.ini.example say so, and the ini text no longer says the game alone paces movies under RTSS.

Not reproduced before the change. Checks that passed: tests/rtss_limit_check.py (40 of 40),
pass_cc_check.py --wall on rtss_limit.c, tools/check_content.py --staged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-13 20:12:26 -05:00
chrg6
ad84e0a1c0 Say what RivaTuner Statistics Server does with a movie at the default limit of 60, where the profile keeps the limit.
The review found that rtss_decide.h rtss_target writes no limit only while a movie runs faster than the play limit, so
at the default limit of 60 a 60 fps movie leaves 60 in RTSS's profile and RTSS holds the movie beside the game's pacer.
Its comment said RTSS at the movie's rate would space out the frames that catch up after a late frame, and README.md
("one limiter at a time") and docs/architecture.md read as if every movie under RTSS were the pacer's alone. The
approved rule writes nothing to the profile at movies when the limit is 60 or more, so the code stays: rtss_target's
and rtss_pace_period's comments now say that at the movie's own rate RTSS keeps holding it and that whether its
limiter lets the frames that catch up through is not measured, README.md drops "one limiter at a time", and
docs/architecture.md lists the movie at 60 among the exceptions to one limiter. tests/rtss_limit_check.c pins a movie
at 60 under a limit of 60: no write, the profile keeps 60, held again after it.

No behaviour changes. Checks that passed: tests/rtss_limit_check.py, tools/check_content.py --staged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-13 20:12:26 -05:00
chrg6
60694532a1 Round a fractional limit down for a RivaTuner Statistics Server without the denominator field, so "display" never holds the game above the refresh.
apply() rounded the millihertz to the nearest whole frame where RTSS has no FramerateLimitDenominator, so "display" on
a 59.94 Hz monitor wrote 60 and on a 143.856 Hz one 144: above the refresh, one frame more than the monitor shows
every 17 s and every 7 s. Only "display" asks a fractional rate under RTSS (fixed limits and movie rates are whole,
frame generation keeps RTSS out), so the new rtss_decide.h rtss_limit_value rounds every fraction down when the
denominator is missing (59/1, 143/1), and keeps a whole rate over 1 and a fraction over 1000 where RTSS knows the
denominator. VRR and present-wait handling stay to be measured.

Not reproduced before the change. rtss_limit_check (T15: rtss_limit_value at 59940, 60000, 143856, 0 and 240000 with
and without the denominator) and rtss_worker_check (round_logged_whole now 59/1 and 143/1, round_logged) pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-13 20:12:26 -05:00
chrg6
4d4b97b043 Let a want reach RivaTuner Statistics Server's profile only once it stayed two polls, and write nothing before the first host present.
A want that flips between a limit and kept-out created and removed RTSS's profile at each flip: with a driver's low
latency vk_lowlat_on() is 0 before the first swapchain and during every swapchain rebuild, so a warm start without the
boot screen wrote the profile and removed it a poll later, and a poll that fell into a rebuild did the same (lane A's
probe: 6 creations and 5 removals for a want flipping each poll, 1 and 1 at start before RTSS hooked the game).
rtss_decide now counts the polls in a row a want stayed: a limit goes into the profile and a kept-out want puts it
back only after RTSS_SETTLE_POLLS (2), while standing aside still ends at once (rtss_limit_active compares the want),
and nothing is written before the first host present (RTSS_WHY_NO_PRESENT). A limit change reaches the profile up to a
second later; the game's limiter holds the new limit meanwhile. The created and removed lines were numbered before.

Not reproduced before the change. rtss_limit_check (T8: kept out for one poll and for two, a second reason, a limit
again; T9: 20 flips after a written limit give no write or put back, 20 from the start none, flips every two polls
act; no write while no host present) and rtss_worker_check (churn_run and every scenario that now settles) pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-13 20:12:26 -05:00
chrg6
f7899e5443 Let the game's limiter stand aside only once RivaTuner Statistics Server is seen holding the game, and give up on RTSS at 1.05 times the limit over three fresh periods.
The worker stood aside as soon as RTSS listed the process and the profile read back, before RTSS had seen a Vulkan
present (with InjectionDelay=15000 it lists the game some seconds after start) or read the new profile. Its frame
count check took the newest period whatever its age: a period frozen at 144 fps after the limit went to 60 and the
window was minimised failed RTSS for the run, and 1.15 times the limit was never caught (lane A's probe: listed_no_api,
stale_fps, over115). rtss_decide now parses the entry's flags and stands aside only when the profile held the target
at the poll before, RTSS lists the game with the Vulkan API value (flags & 0xFFFF == 0xA), RTSS_UPDATE_ASKED is clear,
a new period was seen within max(2.5 s, 2.5 times its length), no movie plays and a host present went out within
200 ms. Only a new period after a poll that stood aside is checked: three in a row over 1.05 times the limit put the
profile back for the run, and a stale period counts neither way. The worker reads the poll time and the newest host
present (gfx_window_hosted_ns), and logs each change of why the game's limiter paces, up to 100 lines.

Not reproduced before the change. rtss_limit_check (the flags at +264; T2 injection delay through not listed, no API,
the update flag, no period and holding; T3 quit; T6 the frame count at 144, 69, 63 fps, a frozen period and a newer
want; the idle case) and rtss_worker_check (over_run, over_slack_run, new api_run and idle_run, and every scenario that
now holds from the poll after the write) pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-13 20:12:25 -05:00
chrg6
04f4d44747 Keep RivaTuner Statistics Server's profile as it was in rtss-profile.txt, so a start after a kill or crash puts it back, and leave it to that start at a crash.
An exit that skipped rtss_limit_restore (Task Manager, a hang, lost_wait_exit, a kill during the pipeline save) left
the game's limit in Profiles\<exe>.cfg, and the next run's first apply took it for the player's own: that run then
put the stale limit back at its close, and a profile the game had made stayed for good (lane A's probe: kill1, then
kill2 'held a limit of 60/1'). The crash handler and the fatal error's end also called into RTSSHooks64.dll from a
process that had failed (P-13).

rtss_limit.c now keeps one line per profile in rtss-profile.txt next to the executable (rtss_decide.h RtssSaved:
whether the profile existed, its old limit and denominator, the value the run wrote), written atomically before the
run's first change of the profile, updated with each value written, and removed once the profile is back (put_back;
also when the first write did not stick). On the first poll with the hooks library a start that finds a line of its
profile puts the profile back first (restore_left, rtss_restore_plan): the old limit, or no profile, unless the player
changed or removed it since, which the written value tells. main.c crash_handler and dispatch.c fatal_end call the
new rtss_limit_crash, which closes the run and leaves the profile to that start with no call into RTSS's library; only
when the file could not be written does it put the profile back as before, and never from the worker's own thread. A
file that cannot be written leaves the run as it was, with one line in the log. Profiles frozen by earlier versions
cannot be told from the player's own.

Not reproduced before the change. rtss_limit_check (T12: the line's format and parse, the file's rewrite, each plan;
the static check that both crash paths go through rtss_limit_crash), rtss_worker_check (state_record, state_player,
state_unwritable, crash_recorded, and kill_restart with its player and edited variants, each a killed run and the next
start in processes of their own), fatal_exit_check and exit_order_check pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-13 20:12:25 -05:00
chrg6
208a10718d Let the game's pacer hold a movie while RivaTuner Statistics Server holds the limit, and keep the play limit in RTSS's profile through it.
During a movie frame_step_cap_ns wanted the movie's rate and returned 0 once RTSS held it, so pace() kept none of the
movie's slots while ocarina_step still gave one movie frame per update: each late frame put the picture behind the
sound for good, the fall-behind d3e50328 fixed for the game's pacer. Each movie start and end also rewrote RTSS's
profile (two saves and two UpdateProfiles per movie in lane A's probe). Now frame_step_cap_ns wants the play limit
through the movie and tells RTSS of the movie (rtss_limit_movie); rtss_pace_period keeps the movie's period from its
first frame, and the worker leaves the movie to the pacer (RTSS_WHY_MOVIE) with the profile as it is. Under a limit
below the movie's rate (30, 40, 45) the profile has no limit for the movie's length (rtss_decide.h rtss_target), since
RTSS at the movie's rate would space out the frames the pacer sends at once to catch up; that is still two writes per
movie there, and none at 60 or more.

Not reproduced before the change. rtss_limit_check (the movie case at 144 and 40, rtss_target, rtss_pace_period),
rtss_worker_check (movie_run, new movie_low_run) and frame_step_check (the want and period through a movie under RTSS)
pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-13 20:12:25 -05:00
chrg6
27a034e946 Keep the 240 ceiling while RivaTuner Statistics Server holds the limit, and take the limit back after 200 ms with no host present.
frame_step_cap_ns returned 0 once RTSS held the limit, so pace() set each slot to now and the acquire never waited.
RTSS holds frames inside the host present, and a minimised window (gfx_present.c present_image skips the present) or
a frame hold gives it none to hold: the game then ran with no limiter but pace_smooth's floor, which follows the
intervals down, and the quick menu is where 640-700 fps read address 0 (frame_rate.c LIMIT_FREE_MAX_HZ).
gfx_present.c flip_locked now stores the time of each host present that took its picture (gfx_window_hosted_ns), and
rtss_decide.h rtss_pace_period gives the pacer the limit's period before the first host present and once none went
out for 200 ms (as vk_lowlat.c HOLD_IDLE_NS), and the 240 ceiling's period, never 0, while RTSS holds. The frames RTSS
lets through come further apart than the ceiling, so pace() waits for none of them; no new wait site.

Not reproduced before the change. frame_step_check (new cases: holding with a host present 10 and 199 ms ago, 250 ms
ago, none yet, not holding, 144 minimised, unlimited) and rtss_limit_check (rtss_pace_period) pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-13 20:12:25 -05:00
chrg6
419e173e8a Check that a want after the exit's RivaTuner restore changes nothing: the restore marks the run closed before anything else and rtss_limit_want returns on it, which the exit order relies on now that the restore runs before the pipeline save while frames still come.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-13 18:46:50 -05:00
chrg6
a0fd6edc48 Take main's base in cheats.py from recomp/layout.py instead of a copy of its value.
tools/cheats.py decodes the pc-relative instructions of a code cheat at main's base and held that base as its own constant, 0x7000000000. It equals recomp/layout.py FIRST_BASE today, where main is the first module of ORDER, but a change of the layout would have left the cheats decoding at the old base, and AGENTS.md has recomp/layout.py alone decide module bases. BASE is now layout.FIRST_BASE. cheats.py is part of the mods' lift key (make_game.py mod_digest), so an install with code cheats lifts once more at its next build; an install without them is not affected.

Not reproduced before the change: no fault today, the two values being equal. Checks that passed: tests/launcher_test.py (218 tests, a new one in which cheats.BASE follows a changed layout.FIRST_BASE, which fails before the change) and tools/check_content.py --staged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-13 18:43:30 -05:00
chrg6
5f90486cf0 Mark the generated modules.c with GENERATED_MARKER, so that check_content.py refuses it in a commit.
make_game.py modules_c writes gen/modules.c with the sha256 of the player's ExeFS modules and the install's absolute paths, and wrote it with no comment at all, so check_content.py, which refuses a file by its marker, its suffix, its name or a key line, would have let it into a commit. AGENTS.md wants the marker on every file the generator emits. Its first line now carries the marker and says what wrote it. It costs players one compile of modules.c and a link at their next build: make_game.py is part of the compile key, and every other object comes from the object cache.

The other half of the finding, the marker on the lift's layout.h, waits: it is a change to recomp/layout.py and recomp/gen.py, whose digest keys every player's lift (a full lift at the update) and the execution profile's fit, so it belongs to the next release that changes recomp/ anyway.

Not reproduced before the change: found by reading the code; the audit's probe showed modules_c without the marker. Checks that passed: tests/launcher_test.py (217 tests; the modules.c test now asserts the marker on its first line and that check_content.problems_for refuses the file, and fails before the change), tests/host_probes_test.py, tests/pgo_build_test.py and tools/check_content.py --staged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-13 18:43:30 -05:00
chrg6
6b051eea58 List kern_ap_stub_ymm as dispatched in check_isa.py, so that a --cpu v2 build passes its instruction check again.
kernel.c's preemption stub has two bodies since 00f06e66: kern_ap_stub_ymm saves YMM0-15 with vmovdqa and is chosen only when ap_init's cpu_keeps_ymm() finds AVX, OSXSAVE and XCR0 bits 1 and 2, and kern_ap_stub_xmm serves every other processor. tools/check_isa.py's DISPATCHED listed only sha256.c's blocks_ni, so it took the YMM body for an undispatched AVX function and stopped every tools/build_game.py --cpu v2 build. The entry names that check. Players' builds (make_game.py) run no such check and were not affected.

Reproduced before the change: kernel.c built with the ucrt64 clang at -march=x86-64-v2 failed tools/check_isa.py with "kern_ap_stub_ymm ...: vmovdqa x32, vzeroupper x1", and passes now. Checks that passed: the new tests/check_isa_test.py (kernel.c and sha256.c built with -march=x86-64-v2 and without -march pass; an AVX function not in DISPATCHED still fails; it fails before the change) and tools/check_content.py --staged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-13 18:43:30 -05:00
chrg6
56db0d485c Make check_platform.py skip the branches that only a Windows build compiles, so that it passes on the runtime and guards it again.
tools/check_platform.py scanned the raw text of each shared runtime file and knew nothing of preprocessor branches, so the Win32 use that input.c, mods_probe.c, rtss_limit.c, vk_cache_file.h, vk_dlaa.c, vk_dlssg.c, vk_dump.c, vk_ffx.cpp, vk_ffx4.cpp, vk_fg.cpp, vk_fg4.cpp and vk_pipeline.c keep behind #ifdef _WIN32 made it fail on every run, at f1a2a64e already: a check that always fails guards nothing. It now leaves out the lines of a Windows-only branch (#ifdef _WIN32, #if defined(_WIN32), #if _WIN32 up to their #else, #elif or #endif, the #else of #ifndef _WIN32 or #if !defined(_WIN32), and conditionals nested in them), found on the text with its comments blanked. Every other branch is still scanned, #elif defined(_WIN32) and #if defined(_WIN32) && X among them, which can fail the check but never lets a use through. docs/building.md lists the check and its test under "Checks".

Reproduced before the change: the check exited with 1 and these 12 FAIL lines on 2f640fb8; it now exits with 0. Checks that passed: the new tests/check_platform_test.py (guarded uses pass, unguarded ones fail, the repository's runtime passes; it fails before the change) and tools/check_content.py --staged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-13 18:43:30 -05:00
chrg6
73d6c8ffb8 Refuse the command line's update while the game runs, as the window's Updates row does.
`launcher.cli update` downloaded the release and switched to it without asking whether the game ran. The new version's continue-update then failed in its rebuild with "the game is running", which left the new launcher with the old build until Rebuild the Game. The window's App.start_update refuses first; the command now does the same before its update check, and ends with exit code 1 and "error: the game is running: close it first, the update rebuilds it".

Not reproduced before the change: found by reading the code. Checks that passed: tests/launcher_test.py (217 tests, a new one in which a running game stops `update` before its check and its download, which fails before the change) and tools/check_content.py --staged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-13 18:43:30 -05:00
chrg6
814c10b355 Keep the Steam shortcut from starting the game while the launcher runs a job in the game folder.
The Steam shortcut's --play runs before the window's single-instance lock and checked only whether the game was running. Started while the window rebuilt the game, installed an update or built the mods' code, it ran mods.prepare into the folder the job was reading and started the old ocarina.exe, and the job then failed at the swap with "ocarina.exe is in use" (an update's install left the new launcher on the old build); during the shaders step, make_game.py's own run of the exe made the shortcut log "already running" and do nothing visible. play_only now tries the launcher folder's lock and lets go of it at once: when another process holds it and data/job-running.json names a job (jobs.running_job, which leaves the marker in place), it logs that the launcher is busy, says which job to wait for in a message box and does not start the game. A marker that a stopped launcher left does not stop it, since its lock went with its process, and neither does the window open without a job.

Not reproduced before the change in a game run: found by reading the code. Checks that passed: tests/launcher_test.py (216 tests, a new one for a held lock with the job's marker, a leftover marker with the lock free, and the window open without a job, which fails before the change) and tools/check_content.py --staged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-13 18:43:30 -05:00
chrg6
0105720217 Take only a sharing violation on ocarina.exe for a running game, not any refusal to write it.
build.game_running opened the exe for writing and took every PermissionError that the read-only attribute did not explain for a running game. Python reports a sharing violation (a running image) and access denied (an access list that denies the player writes, or Controlled Folder Access switched on for a game folder under Documents) as the same PermissionError, so an exe that nothing ran but the player could not write kept Play answering "The game is already running", the Steam shortcut doing nothing and a rebuild failing with "the game is running". The open now goes through CreateFileW, with every share mode granted, and reads its error: 32 (ERROR_SHARING_VIOLATION) is a running game; 5 on a read-only exe clears the attribute and tries again as before; any other access denied is no running game, and the rebuild's check logs that the exe cannot be opened for writing, so that make_game.py's later failure to replace it has its cause beside it in launcher.log. The game's own profile lock is not probed instead: a handle on it, even for a moment once a second, makes a starting game end with "another copy of the game is running".

Not reproduced before the change in a game run: the audit's probes showed it on a scratch exe with a deny-write access entry. Checks that passed: tests/launcher_test.py (215 tests, a new one for errors 32, 5 and 0, a read-only exe and the real CreateFileW call on a free file and on a running sleeper compiled with the ucrt64 clang) and tools/check_content.py --staged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-13 18:43:30 -05:00
chrg6
8f42883a74 Tell the end of a game started from the Steam shortcut as Play tells it, with a message box for a fatal one.
play_only, the --play path of the Steam shortcut, logged only "the game ended (code N)" in launcher.log: it read no FATAL line, added no note to the game's log and showed nothing, so a game that ended with 70, 71, 72 or a Windows status left the player with no word of why (as when Steam starts it while the window replaces a save, and it ends at once with "another copy of the game is running"). The 7b0dbeb1 change that logs every end touched the window's watch only. play_only now follows the run with GameRun, the Restart's copies too, and takes the same game_end as the window: the line in launcher.log, the note in the game's log, and a message box only for an end worth one (a FATAL line, 70, 71 or 72, a Windows status; not 0, nor 1 from Task Manager's End task). The logs are written before the box, which waits for OK while Steam still counts the game as running.

Not reproduced before the change in a game run: the audit's probe showed it with a stand-in process. Checks that passed: tests/launcher_test.py (214 tests, a new one for the Steam shortcut's ends with codes 70, 0xC0000005, 0 and 1, which fails before the change) and tools/check_content.py --staged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-13 18:43:30 -05:00
chrg6
8de99df6eb Explain a lost device's exit code 72 with the game's FATAL line, and follow the copy the game's own Restart starts for the code it really ends with.
The launcher read the game's FATAL line only after codes 70 and 71, so a run that ended through vk_device.c vk_device_lost_check (code 72, as in the AMD device losses of 2026-11-12) showed a bare "code 72" with no cause. 72 now joins 70 and 71 in FATAL_CODES and has a text of its own, which stands without a FATAL line because the loss's watchdog (vk_device.c lost_wait_exit) can end the run before that line is written.

The game's Restart (gfx_present.c gfx_window_closed) starts the exe again and ends the process the launcher started with code 0, and the launcher took that 0 as the run's code. A restarted copy that ended with 70, 71 or 72 was logged as an end with code 0 and its FATAL line was never shown; one that was killed or hung got a note saying code 0 in its log. Once the process it follows has ended with 0 while the exe still runs, the launcher now finds the copy by its image file (winsys.game_copy, compared as a file so that another install's game is not taken), holds a handle to it and takes its exit code; a further Restart is followed the same way. A copy it could not find ends with its code logged as not known. After code 0 or an unknown code, a FATAL line in a log written since the start can only be such a copy's, and it is shown as one; a log older than the start (a run that ended before it opened its own) is not read. A log cut at its 64 MiB cap (main.c log_sink) wrote its end lines to stderr only, and no longer gets a note saying it has no line of its own end. The end's handling is one function, game_end, for the Steam shortcut's play to share.

Not reproduced before the change in a game run: the audit's probes showed each of these ends with stand-in processes and logs. Checks that passed: tests/launcher_test.py (213 tests, new ones for code 72 with and without its FATAL line, the followed copy, a copy not found, a FATAL line after code 0 and a log older than the start, the cut log, and game_copy on a sleeper compiled with the ucrt64 clang) and tools/check_content.py --staged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-13 18:43:30 -05:00
chrg6
e4f10a5a02 Log the hang watch's list of guest thread waits after the kernel lock is released, not while it is held.
The review of the hang watch found that kernel.c kern_wait_report called rt_log for up to 16 lines while it held the
kernel lock G. When the log queue is full and the log thread is stuck holding its write lock, one of the stalls the
watch reports, the put that drains the queue waits there with G held, which turns a log stall into a freeze of every
guest thread. wait_watch (NX2NAVI_WAIT_WATCH_S, off by default) had the same pattern.

wait_pass now formats its lines into a buffer of the caller's (WAIT_LINE_CAP bytes a line, room for the 16 or 24 lines
asked for), and kern_wait_report and wait_watch log them with the new wait_lines_log after unlock. A line that finds
no room ends the pass unmarked, so wait_watch logs it at its next pass. The lines read as before.

Not reproduced before the change (it needs a stalled log thread beside a report). tests/hang_watch_check.py checks
statically that wait_pass logs nothing and that both callers log only after unlock; the check fails on the code
before this change and passes after it, and the program's cases pass. The compile check of kernel.c passes with no
-Wall warnings.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-13 18:43:24 -05:00
chrg6
cd3f015732 Log the guest's ExitProcess line after the exit guard, and bring the comments on gfx_window_closed's return up to date.
The review of the exit sequence found that svc.c case 0x07 logged "guest ExitProcess at ...; exiting" before
rt_exit_begin. When a close had already begun, the guest thread that the guard then parks still claimed to exit, and
past the log cap the line fell outside the end's reserve, which rt_exit_begin opens. It also found that host.h and
gfx_wsys.h still said gfx_window_closed does not return, though it returns for its own thread coming back, and that
rt_exit_begin's comment spoke of the window thread handling a message inside the sequence, which since the close
runs on a thread of its own happens only in the fallback.

svc.c logs the line after rt_exit_begin returns 1. The two header comments say gfx_window_closed returns only for its
own thread coming back (gfx_present.c rt_exit_begin), and rt_exit_begin's comment says the window thread runs the
sequence itself only when gfx_window_win.c exit_start could make no thread.

tests/exit_order_check.py checks statically that 0x07's rt_log comes after rt_exit_begin; it fails on the code
before this change and passes after it. exit_order_check and the compile check of every runtime file (a header
changed) pass, with no new -Wall warnings in svc.c and gfx_present.c.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-13 18:43:24 -05:00
chrg6
66c607414b End a hung fatal error's report with its own code when a thread waiting beside it gives up, not with the crash code.
The review of the shared failure guard found that a thread parked in dispatch.c rt_ending_enter ended the process
with 71 after 30 s even when the first report was a FATAL (70, or 72 for a lost device), so a fatal error whose report
hung read as a crash to the launcher.

rt_ending_enter now takes the code its caller ends with: fatal_end passes its own, main.c crash_handler 71. The first
caller stores it next to ending_tid, and a waiting thread that gives up after 30 s ends the process with it. Before
the store the value is 71, as before.

Reproduced before the change with a one-off build of tests/fatal_exit_check.c given a fatal note that never returns
and a fault on another thread: the process ended with 71 after 30.5 s; with this change it ends with 70 after 30.5 s.
That case takes 30 s, so the matrix gets a static check instead: tests/fatal_exit_check.py holds rt_ending_enter to
storing the first caller's code and ending with it, fatal_end to passing its code, and crash_handler to its first
line `if (!rt_ending_enter(71)) plat_exit(71);`. fatal_exit_check and the compile check of every runtime file (a
header changed) pass, with no new -Wall warnings.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-13 18:43:24 -05:00
chrg6
e6a6d6a809 Skip RivaTuner's restore at a fatal error on the RTSS thread too, not only at a crash there.
The review of the RTSS thread change found that only main.c crash_handler skipped rtss_limit_restore on the "rtss"
thread. An rt_fatal on that thread while it holds rtss_limit.c's lock still called the restore from dispatch.c
fatal_end, whose trylocks then spent a second for nothing before the end went on. A-14 names fatal_end.

fatal_end now reads plat_thread_name and calls rtss_limit_restore only when the thread is not "rtss", as
crash_handler does.

Not reproduced in the game before the change. tests/fatal_exit_check.c's stand-in restore now says it ran, and a new
fatal_rtss mode calls rt_fatal on a thread spawned with the name "rtss": on the code before this change the restore
ran there (the check fails), now it does not, and the process still ends with 70 after the rumble stop. The other
cases check that the restore runs from any other thread. fatal_exit_check and the compile check of dispatch.c pass,
with no -Wall warnings.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-13 18:43:24 -05:00
chrg6
78e9d23211 Write a fatal error's frame-time summary after RivaTuner's restore and the rumble stop, not before them.
The review of the fatal summary change found that dispatch.c fatal_end called perf_summary_flush_try (ft_stop waits up
to 50 ms, then the summary and the stutter map are formatted) before rtss_limit_restore and rt_rumble_stop_bounded.
The lane's order for the failed ends, and A-6's for the orderly ones (gfx_present.c rt_exit_steps), puts what a kill
of the process must not lose first: RTSS's profile and the controller's rumble.

perf_summary_flush_try now runs after the restore and the bounded rumble stop, just before the stdio flushes and
plat_terminate. The summary's lines still reach the log: rt_log_sync ran at the start of fatal_end, so every later
line is written as it is made.

Not reproduced before the change (an order of steps). tests/fatal_exit_check.py checks statically that fatal_end
calls perf_summary_flush_try after rt_rumble_stop_bounded; the check fails on the code before this change and passes
after it, and the program's cases (fatal, fatal_rumble, crash_crash, fatal_crash, crash_fatal) pass. The compile
check of dispatch.c passes with no -Wall warnings.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-13 18:43:24 -05:00
chrg6
313ef09081 Open the log's end reserve only when the process is ending, not at a bug capture's log sync in play.
The review of the log tail change found that main.c log_sink opened the 4 MiB reserve past the cap on g_log_final as
well as on g_log_ending. bugcap.c write_log_tail calls rt_log_sync in play, which sets g_log_final, so after a bug
capture in a trace = perf session past the cap, ordinary play lines filled the reserve (about 6 minutes at 12 KB/s),
the end's lines were dropped again, and the "end of the run follows" line came mid-run.

The reserve is now keyed on g_log_ending alone, as E-10's design had it. The ends that relied on rt_log_sync now call
rt_log_ending first: dispatch.c fatal_end and main.c crash_handler right after their guard, vk_device.c
lost_wait_exit's watchdog before its sync, and plat_exit through the new main.c log_sync_ending (plat_exit_hook in a
game run), so every path that ends through plat_exit marks the end too. rt_exit_begin and perf_summary_flush call it
as before.

Not reproduced in the game before the change. tests/log_cap_check.py gains a capture case (rt_log_sync in play, 1000
more play lines, then the end): on the code before this change 58 play lines took the reserve, the end line came at
the sync and no end line reached the file; now no play line passes the cap and the end's lines fill the reserve. A
fatal case runs rt_log_ending and then rt_log_sync, and static checks hold crash_handler, log_sync_ending, fatal_end
and lost_wait_exit to calling rt_log_ending before rt_log_sync. log_cap_check, fatal_exit_check (with a stand-in for
rt_log_ending) and the compile checks of main.c, dispatch.c and vk_device.c pass, with no new -Wall warnings.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-13 18:43:23 -05:00
chrg6
b8b57cfd53 Take the file lock at the end of a save file call only when a CloseFile is pending, not at the end of every call.
The review of the save file use count found that fs_host.c file_release took `lock` exclusive whenever users dropped
to 0, which is the end of every single read_file, write_file, file_size, set_file_size and flush_file, not only when
a CloseFile had marked the slot. The exclusive acquisition waits for every shared holder, such as the fsync loop of a
non-save Commit (commit, FlushFileBuffers under the shared lock), and while it waits it holds up new file_of callers:
a new wait on the guest threads that the change had said it did not add.

file_release now takes the lock only when it finds closing set after its decrement. The decrement and the load of
closing, and close_file's store of closing and load of users, are sequentially consistent pairs, so either the last
call out sees the mark or close_file sees users at 0 and closes the file itself; the check under the lock still keeps
the close to one. closing is an int32_t read and stored with atomics; a slot is emptied by the new file_clear, which
stores users and closing as atomics because the call that has just left the slot may read closing without the lock,
and open_file fills only h, mode and save.

Not reproduced in the game before the change. tests/fs_file_use_check.py gains a case: 1000 reads with no close take
the exclusive lock 0 times, and a read ends while another thread holds the lock shared. It failed on the code before
this change (1000 exclusive takes, the read waited) and passes after it, as do its close-during-a-read case and its
20000 closes and opens beside a reader (six runs, no foreign bytes, no double close). The compile check of fs_host.c
passes with no -Wall warnings.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-13 18:43:23 -05:00
chrg6
a135c19450 Ignore the focus loss that the close's own hide of the window sends, so the exit summary keeps the session's frames.
The review of the window close change found that hiding the active window in gfx_window_win.c exit_start makes
Windows send WM_ACTIVATEAPP(FALSE), which wnd_proc passed on to gfx_window_focus_changed(0). In play, perf.c
perf_focus_lost then asked for the session's reports, and the present thread, which runs until rt_exit_steps reaches
prof_write, wrote "frametime: at focus loss" for the whole session at its next present, with the stutter map and the
memory ranking, and started a new period. "frametime: exit" then covered only the few frames since the hide, or was
missing when none came, so a normal close no longer left the exit summary the play-test's "Normal close" item reads.

wnd_proc now returns at a focus loss once g_exit_started is set. exit_start sets it on the window thread before
ShowWindow, and the message comes on the same thread inside that call, so the check has no race. A gained focus is
still passed on.

Not reproduced before the change (it needs a play run). tests/exit_order_check.py checks statically that
WM_ACTIVATEAPP returns before gfx_window_focus_changed for a loss once g_exit_started is set and that exit_start sets
the flag before the hide; the check fails on the code before this change and passes after it. The compile check of
gfx_window_win.c passes with no new -Wall warnings.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-13 18:43:23 -05:00
chrg6
b23acff301 Leave a line in the log when a module ends the process with ExitProcess, and write the gathered lines at a focus loss.
Two runs of 2026-11-13 (the 0.10.0 fresh install's nx2navi.1.log, 7,974,927 bytes, and the 0.9.2 test's
nx2navi.3.log) ended seconds after "window lost the focus" with exit code 0, no WER event and no line of their own:
an ExitProcess or exit() called by a module in the process and a kill from outside could not be told apart, and
both lose the up to 250 ms of lines the log thread was gathering. A direct ExitProcess skips perf.c's atexit sync.

(a) ExitProcess stops every other thread and then calls each module's detach, the executable's TLS callbacks
included; TerminateProcess calls none. win32.c exit_note_tls, in the .CRT$XLB list beside _tls_used, writes on
DLL_PROCESS_DETACH what the log queue holds (logq.c logq_peek: the bytes as they stand, no lock) and one line,
"exit: the process is ending through ExitProcess, not one of the game's own ends", with the return addresses that
led there. It runs under the loader lock with the other threads gone, so it uses no C runtime (hex written by hand)
and does not ask the loader: the addresses are named from a module list noted at start and at each focus loss
(plat_exit_note_modules: EnumProcessModules, two tables and a writers' lock the callback never takes), and
RtlCaptureStackBackTrace and WriteFile take no lock of the process. plat_exit, plat_terminate and plat_reexec set
the orderly flag (plat_exit_orderly), and main does once main_run has returned, so a tool mode's exit() leaves no
line; a library's exit() during a game run does, naming ucrtbase and its caller. main.c log_open sets it up for a
game run that writes a log file. Linux has empty stand-ins.

(b) gfx_window_focus_changed calls the new main.c rt_log_focus_lost at a focus loss: logq_nudge makes the log thread
write what it gathers at once (a flag log_main's gathering loop checks) and the module list is noted again.

Not reproduced before the change (the two ends are unexplained). The new tests/exit_tls_check.py links win32.c and
logq.c with a queued line still being gathered: ExitProcess from the program and exit() write the line and the note
naming exit_tls_check.exe; TerminateProcess, plat_exit and a return after plat_exit_orderly write no note.
tests/logq_check.c gains a nudge case, which fails with the flag left unset (252 ms) and passes with it.
thread_end_check, fatal_exit_check, crash_stack_check, exit_order_check, save_share_check and the compile checks of
every runtime file pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-13 18:43:23 -05:00